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Abstract: Inefficient use of scarce and fragmented land challenges the sustainability of agriculture. 
Land markets may improve land use efficiency. In recent years, China has employed various 
instruments to promote land markets. This paper investigates whether land markets affect households’ 
land use efficiency, based on data from 1,202 farm households in Jiangsu Province. The measure of 
land use efficiency was derived from a stochastic frontier production function, and a control function 
approach was employed to correct for selection bias. The results indicated that many households are 
using land inefficiently. While renting in land increases land use efficiency, it is not affected by 
renting out land, implying that households are not giving up land for efficiency gains. We also provide 
suggestive evidence that the positive effect of renting in land results from abundant agricultural labour 
due to labour market failure. 
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Sustainable development requires the provision of sufficient food for a growing world 
population with a decreasing area of land, yet in many developing and transition economies 
such as China, rapid urban sprawl often requires large-scale land conversion (Tan et al., 2009; 
Zhong et al., 2018). Over time, a dramatic decrease in agricultural land has been observed, 
undermining the capacity to supply food (Long et al., 2016) and thus raising concerns about 
food security and calling for the efficient use of agricultural land to increase yields per area 
(Zhou et al., 2018). Instruments to increase land use efficiency represent as a significant 
challenge for policy makers in developing and transition economies. 
Functioning land rental markets are often viewed as a potential instrument for enhancing land 
use efficiency (Jin and Deininger, 2009). For example, previous studies have demonstrated 
that imperfect land markets have a negative effect on land productivity (Heltberg, 1998; 
Holden et al., 2001). In China in particular, scenario analysis suggests that land transfer could 
lead to a significant increase in productivity if barriers in land rental markets were to be 
removed (Deininger and Jin, 2005). Similarly, Feng et al. (2010) found that many Chinese 
farmers who rent in additional land can increase their productivity. These studies have 
improved our understanding of the importance of land markets in enhancing land use 
efficiency. 
Our study complements this literature by investigating whether participation in land markets 
affects household land use efficiency, based on data concerning rice producers in Jiangsu, 
China. Its contributions are twofold. First, we use a new measure of land use efficiency, 
defined as the ratio of minimum feasible land input to observed land input, conditional on 
yield level and other inputs. Traditional measures of resource efficiency are often defined as 




other inputs. The identified effects of land markets on land productivity could therefore result 
from a change in other inputs, rather than from land markets. Our measure also differs from 
the comprehensive efficiency measure of production, i.e. technical efficiency, by focusing on 
a particular type of input efficiency. To our knowledge, there is only one study by Zhang et al. 
(2018b) that has employed a similar approach to measuring land use efficiency in corn 
production. However, we are the first to explain the variation of this new measure of land use 
efficiency. Second, we provide suggestive evidence about the causal mechanisms whereby 
renting land may affect land use efficiency. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two introduces recent 
developments in land rental markets in Jiangsu and explains causal mechanisms. In section 
three, we present the data collection and estimation strategies. The main results are presented 
in section four, followed by a discussion and conclusions in section five. 
Background and theory 
Land markets in China 
In China, agricultural land is governed under the Household Responsibility System (HRS). 
The HRS allows households to contract with village collectives to gain use rights over some 
agricultural land. Compared to the collective farming system, the HRS brought about 
decentralised decision-making over agricultural production, although in its initial stage 
households were not allowed to transfer land to others due to concerns about landless 
households and social inequality. It was not until the beginning of 21st century that land 
markets in rural China started to develop. However, high transaction costs caused by insecure 
property rights and land fragmentation limited the development of rural land markets for a 




of agricultural land had ever been traded on the rental market in this study area of Jiangsu 
Province. At country level, land markets were even less developed (Liu et al., 2017). 
Rapid growth in land rental markets started in around 2008 when intermediate agents, such as 
land cooperatives (cf. Liu et al. (2018)), started to get involved in the process. By the end of 
2014, 58 % of farmland in the province was engaged in land markets, accounting for about 
two million hectares of farmland (Zhang et al., 2018a). Forty-four percent of the transferred 
land was used for food crops (JSMAS, 2015), particularly rice production. An important role 
in the process is played by intermediate agents, who rent in land from households and rent it 
out to others after land consolidation and infrastructure establishment. These agents often 
have a bureaucratic background and are financially supported by local governments with the 
aim of consolidating fragmented agricultural land and scaling up farming. In 2014, 
approximately 29.7 % of transferred farmland was handled by such intermediate agents 
(JSMAS, 2015). 
The role of land rental in land use efficiency 
There are several channels through which land markets can affect land use efficiency. The 
first is economies of scale. Farms with little land often attract insufficient labour, and high 
fixed costs for machinery or irrigation could lead to lower land productivity (Wu et al., 2005). 
Even with the same level of access to production factors, often farms with little land are 
unable to use the inputs efficiently. Input losses per unit of land are greater on small farms 
(Ma et al., 2014). Ceteris paribus, land use efficiency is typically higher for large farms. 
Since renting in land increases a household’s farm size, land use efficiency can be expected 





The second channel is land quality. Farmers tend to cultivate more productive land under land 
market imperfections (Holden et al., 2001). This implies that if land markets develop, the 
soils and nutrient contents of traded land may often be of poorer quality. Indeed, Rahman 
(2010) found that soil quality is negatively correlated with renting out decisions. 
Consequently, households who rent in land may have a lower land use efficiency and those 
who rent out land may have a higher land use efficiency due to quality differences (Rahman 
and Rahman, 2009). 
The third channel is tenure security (Kumari and Nakano, 2015). Compared to owned land, 
rented land has less tenure security, especially for short-term contracts. Households that rent 
in land would have overlapping land rights with both secure and insecure property rights 
(Deininger and Ali, 2008). Tenure insecurity may restrain investment and reduce land 
productivity (Deininger et al., 2011), but it may also create an incentive for tenants to 
increase output (Menale and Stein, 2007), e.g. by maximising yield with myopic planning 
(e.g. more mineral fertiliser to increase short-term yields at the expense of long-term soil 
fertility) in the case of short-term contracts. Since households that do not participate in land 
markets or that rent out land only have land with secure property rights, they are likely to be 
affected by this. 
The fourth channel is limited access to labour markets. If farmers cannot find non-agricultural 
employment, they may continue farming due to low opportunity costs of labour (Deininger et 
al., 2018; Lamb, 2003). Consequently, households would have more labour relative to land, 
which may result in inefficiencies. If there is such a market failure, land markets could partly 
help to address it and improve efficiency (Lamb, 2003). Households that rent in (out) land 
would use their labour inputs more (less) efficiently, and consequently their land use 




Data and estimation  
Data collection 
We used data from a household survey of rice producers in Jiangsu Province. The survey took 
place between 2013 and the beginning of 2014, and covered counties in which arable land 
accounts for more than 10 % of the total land. From these counties, we randomly selected 64 
towns. In each town, we then randomly selected two villages and interviewed approximately 
ten randomly selected households in each village. Information in the survey refers to the end 
of 2012. A structured questionnaire was employed to collect information on the households’ 
land market participation, demographic characteristics, land endowments and village 
characteristics. The final sample consisted of 1,202 households (Table 1), of which more than 
65 % reported having rice production in 2012. For the efficiency analysis, we excluded 
households with zero yield or zero inputs in land or seeds for rice production.  
Table 1. Sample distribution across Jiangsu Province 
City Number of observations Percentage 
Suzhou 55 4.58 
Wuxi 57 4.74 
Nanjing 66 5.49 
Taizhou 74 6.16 
Huaian 83 6.91 
Changzhou 97 8.07 
Xuzhou 98 8.15 
Yancheng 111 9.23 
Suqian 138 11.48 
Yangzhou 210 17.47 
Lianyungang 213 17.72 
Total 1,202 100 





Estimation strategy  
Deriving land use efficiency 
Our study’s measure of land use efficiency follows that of Reinhard et al. (1999) which was 
originally developed to measure fertiliser use or environmental efficiency (Abdulai and 
Abdulai, 2017; Kouser and Qaim, 2015; Ma et al., 2014). A recent paper has applied it to 
measure land use efficiency in corn production (Zhang et al., 2018b), although there is 
concern about its application. For example, in comparison to fertiliser, land inputs are 
lumpier and less divisible. However, because households can adjust their land input by 
allocating proportions of land to different crops, by laying off land or by renting additional 
land we argue that its application to land use efficiency is appropriate. 
To derive land use efficiency, we first estimated technical inefficiency. For this purpose, we 
employed a stochastic frontier production function. The translog model was defined as: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗





+0.5𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)2 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is the natural logarithm, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is the total output of producer 𝑖𝑖, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 𝑗𝑗 
input quantities, including labour, seed, pesticide, machine and fertilizer, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is the quantity 
of land input, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 captures regional fixed effects using town dummies. Since there is 
typically not much variation in land prices within a Chinese town, the inclusion of town 
dummies can be seen as a control for land prices. 𝛽𝛽 are parameters to be estimated, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is a 
random term, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is a non-negative error term measuring the technical inefficiency which 
follows an exponential distribution. 




a producer who uses land efficiently can be obtained by replacing the observed quantity of 
land input (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) in Eq. (1) with the minimum feasible land input 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀. The 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is set at zero 
because a producer who uses land efficiently given the yield level and other inputs implies 
there is no technical inefficiency. Thus, we get the following equation: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗





+0.5𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀)2 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
(2) 































 is defined as land use efficiency by measuring the ratio of minimum 
feasible land input to observed land input. Assuming a positive under-root term in Eq. (3), 
land use efficiency 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 can be obtained by taking the exponent: 




Estimating the effect of land markets 
To estimate the effect of participation in land markets on land use efficiency, we defined the 
following function: 
 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (5) 




land respectively, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is a vector of other variables that affect land use efficiency, α are 
coefficients to be estimated, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is an error term. Since the efficiency score is a fractional 
response variable, the best way of modelling Eq. (5) is a beta regression estimated by 
maximum likelihood (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004). In particular, beta regression addresses 
fractional variables when the unity interval is open, which is the case in our study. We 
employed a link function of complementary log-logistic form for beta regressions, but results 
from other link functions (logit, probit etc.) were similar and are available from the authors 
upon request. 
Since efficient (inefficient) land users may increase (decrease) farm size via participation in 
the land rental market, there may be reverse causality, which raises the concern of 
endogeneity. To address this concern, we employed a two-step control function approach 
(Wooldridge, 2014). Following Liu et al. (2017), Lloyd-Smith et al. (2018) and Tessema et al. 
(2018), we ran a probit model for 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  respectively1. The probit 
models were defined as follows: 
 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛾𝛾0𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, with  𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = �
1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0,       𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (6) 
 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛾𝛾0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂, with 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = �
1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0,        𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  (7) 
                                                 
1 Some authors have employed a linear probability model in the first step of the control function for dichotomous variables 
(e.g. Brasselle et al. (2002) and Rao et al. (2017)). However, Lewbel et al. (2012) point out that a linear probability model in 
the first step could lead to biased estimates if the outcome variable in the second step is binary or limited. Brasselle et al. 
(2002) also point out that key assumptions (e.g. homoscedasticity) of control functions would be violated if the first step 




where 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗) is a latent variable, and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  (𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) is the 
observed decision of participation in land markets, which equals to one if 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ 
(𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗) is larger than zero. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables, including 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 and 
at least one instrumental variable 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 which affects 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 but has no 
effect on 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖. A Wald test of the statistical significance of the instrumental variables in Eq. 
(6) and (7) showed their strength. Then, the predicted generalised residual 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
from Eq. (6) and 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 from Eq. (7) could be obtained as follows: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆(𝛾𝛾1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) − (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆(−𝛾𝛾1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) (8) 
 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆(𝛾𝛾1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) − (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆(−𝛾𝛾1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) (9) 
where 𝜆𝜆(∙) is the inverse Mills ratio. For the probit model, the generalised residual equalled 
the inverse Mills ratio (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2018). The two generalised residuals were then 
introduced in Eq. (5): 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (10) 
A beta regression of Eq. (10) provided consistent estimates of α1 and α2. The statistical 
significance of α4 and α5 based on t-statistics revealed the presence of endogeneity. To test 
whether the instruments could be excluded, we followed the approach suggested Abdulai et al. 
(2011), which re-estimated Eq. (10) with instruments:  
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0′ + 𝛼𝛼1′𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2′𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3′𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4′𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼5′𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂  
+𝛼𝛼6′ 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖′ 
(11) 
If α6
′ is not statistically different from zero, then the instrumental variable 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 can be 
excluded from Eq. (11), implying that the instrument is valid. We clustered standard errors at 




Since the estimation of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  involved an error component, the concern arose that the 
two-step estimation of the determinants of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, which first predicts the efficiency variable 
and then regresses efficiency variables on explanatory variables, could be inconsistent. 
Indeed, Battese and Coelli (1995) argue that for the determinants of technical efficiency, the 
two-step estimation cannot fulfil the error component being independently and identically 
distributed. However, because the measure of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is not calculated with a predetermined 
distributional assumption, but rather from the parameter estimates describing the structure of 
production technology (Reinhard et al., 2002), the two-step estimation was appropriate. 
Variable description 
Definitions and descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs are shown in Table 2. Rice output, 
land input and seed input were measured in physical units. The average rice output, land 
input and seed input per household in 2013 in our research area were 3,160 kg, 5.78 mu2 and 
36.34 kg respectively. Labour input was measured in days, with an average of 99.6 days. The 
inputs of machine, pesticide and fertiliser were measured in monetary terms, with the average 
levels of 1,072, 107.1 and 1,237 RMB Yuan respectively.3 
Table 3 shows the main variables of our study. Of the 1,202 households, 24.3 % rented in 
land, while 23.5% rented out land. To explain land use efficiency, we controlled for other 
factors according to the literature on land productivity and resource use efficiency in general 
(Abdulai and Abdulai, 2017; Kouser and Qaim, 2015; Ma et al., 2014). Specifically, we 
controlled for household heads’ age and education. Age is a proxy for the experience of the 
                                                 
2 One hectare is equal to 15 mu. 
3 Due to data limitation, we were unable to measure these inputs in physical units. We followed Ma et al. (2014) in their use 




head of the farm household. The older the farmer, the better his or her ability to organise 
agricultural production and achieve the same yield level with less land. For the same reason, 
we included the education and agricultural training of the household heads (Abdulai and 
Abdulai, 2017).  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of inputs and output in rice production 
Variable Unit Mean S.D. Observations 
Yield Kg 3,160 3,707 784 
Land Mu 5.780 6.459 787 
Seed Kg 36.34 52.92 783 
Labour Day 99.60 217.5 784 
Machine Yuan 1,072 1,414 782 
Pesticide Yuan 107.1 60.23 782 
Fertilizer Yuan 1,237 1,441 780 
Notes: One US dollar is equal to 6.15 Yuan (average in 2013). One day equals eight working hours. 
 
We introduced household heads’ experience with off-farm employment and family size in the 
model. However, off-farm employment may reduce labour availability for agricultural 
production and prevent households from farming in a timely manner, leading to lower land 
use efficiency. Yet off-farm employment, which captures the level of household off-farm 
income, increases households’ income, which could stimulate investments in production and 
increase yields (Rozelle et al., 1999). Family size indicates household labour availability and 






Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean S.D. Observations 
Rent in 1 = Household rented in land, 0 = otherwise 0.243 0.429 1,202 
Rent out 1 = Household rented out land, 0 = otherwise 0.235 0.424 1,202 
Age of household head Age in years 57.98 10.15 1,202 
Education of household head 1 = Illiterate, 2 = Primary education, 3 = Secondary education, 4 = High 
school education, 5 = Undergraduate education and above 
2.674 0.973 1,202 
Off-farm experience of household head 1 = Household head had off-farm work before survey, 0 = otherwise 0.681 0.466 1,202 
Household size Number of household members 4.443 1.836 1,202 
Land endowment Area of land owned by the household (Mu) 5.653 3.296 1,201 
Number of land plots The number of land plots owned by the household 4.092 2.513 1,190 
Agricultural training 1 = Household head received training in agricultural techniques before, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.286 0.452 1,202 
Agricultural assets The total value of assets for agricultural production (10,000 RMB Yuan) 0.475 1.667 1,185 
Other durable assets  The total value of other durable assets in the family (10,000 RMB Yuan) 1.377 5.283 1,070 
Disaster 1= if agricultural production suffered from flood or drought last year, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.374 0.484 1,070 
Share of households in land rental market Share of households that have participated in land rental market in the 
village (%) 
0.447 0.235 1,202 
Administrative intervention Share of households that report the presence of government intervention on 
land market in the village (%) 
0.113 0.224 1,202 





We introduced land area distributed from the village as a measure of household land 
endowment and the number of land plots to indicate the extent of land fragmentation. 
Small farms may have lower productivity because of negative economies of scale 
(Wu et al., 2005). The number of land plots may decrease the efficiency of other 
inputs and reduce land productivity and efficiency (Rahman and Rahman, 2009). The 
total value of agricultural assets and other durable assets were also controlled for 
because greater investment in agriculture may increase yields. Lastly, we controlled 
for land quality imprecisely using a variable of whether a household suffered a natural 
disaster such as flood or drought in production. Such natural disasters are expected to 
reduce yield level and land use efficiency. 
The instrumental variables we employed were the fraction of households who 
participated in the land market in the village and the extent of administrative 
intervention in land markets, measured by the fraction of households reporting the 
presence of government intervention in land markets in the village. A high fraction of 
households in the village, either renting in or renting out land, implies an active land 
market and is expected to be positively correlated with households’ probability of 
participation. Previous studies demonstrate that farmers’ decisions, such as 
technology adoption, are affected by other people (Conley and Udry, 2010; Minten 
and Barrett, 2008). Administrative intervention is also expected to affect household 




performance drives the development of land markets in China (Liu et al., 2016).  
Valid instrumental variables should not affect land use efficiency through channels 
other than land markets. This is called the exclusion restriction. In China, 
administrative intervention in land markets has nothing to do with farmers’ production 
decisions. Moreover, the differences in the activeness of land markets in our research 
area are mainly driven by local institutional innovations, which are also unrelated to 
farmers’ production decisions (Ito et al., 2016). Thus, it is fair to assume that the two 
instrumental variables do not affect land use efficiency through channels other than 
land markets, which can be tested with Eq. (11). 
Results 
Estimates of the production frontier and land use efficiency 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the stochastic frontier production function. We found 
that more land input significantly increased the yield level of rice production. 
Similarly, pesticide inputs also had a positive effect on yield, indicating that the pest 
control effect of pesticide use reduced yield loss in agricultural production (Zhang et 
al., 2015). Meanwhile, the interaction term between land and pesticides also showed a 
significant and positive effect on yield, which further confirmed the findings on land 
and pesticides. While the combination of machine and pesticide input showed a 
negative effect on yield, the combination of machine and fertiliser input showed a 




inputs at the ploughing stage, and frequent ploughing reduces pesticide use efficiency 
to achieve a lower yield level, but improves fertiliser use efficiency to achieve a 
higher yield level. 
Table 4. Translog estimates of stochastic production frontier for rice production 
Variable Coeff. Variable Coeff. Variable Coeff. 
Land 1.168*** Machine squared -0.014 Seed × Machine -0.000 





Seed 0.031 Pesticide squared -0.006 Seed × Pesticide -0.000 





Labour -0.081 Fertilizer squared -0.011 Seed × Fertilizer -0.003 





Machine -0.000 Land × Seed 0.020 Labour × Machine 0.009 





Pesticide 0.340** Land × Labour 0.001 Labour × Pesticide 0.008 





Fertiliser -0.085 Land × Machine -0.025 Labour × Fertilizer -0.004 





Land squared 0.033 Land × Pesticide 0.065* Machine × Pesticide -0.045* 





Seed squared -0.000 Land × Fertilizer -0.059 Machine × Fertilizer 0.058** 





Labour squared 0.003 Seed × Labour -0.008 Pesticide × Fertilizer -0.015 





Log likelihood 553.48 
    
Observations 779 
    
Note: Natural logarithm is employed for inputs and output. Town dummies are controlled. Clustered 
standard errors at the village level are reported in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 




efficiency score. Figure 1 and Table 5 show the distribution and summary statistics of 
land use efficiency scores. In general, land use efficiency scores were skewed to the 
left, with approximately 50 % of households having land use efficiency scores at or 
below 0.940. The average land use efficiency score was 0.930. Since the measure of 
the land use efficiency score 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖
 is the ratio of minimum feasible land input to 
observed land input, on average 7.53 % of land was overused compared to the ideal 
situation of everybody using land efficiently.4  
 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimate of land use efficiency 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of land use efficiency scores (observations = 779) 
Land use efficiency Scores 
Mean 0.930 
Minimum 0.619 
25th percentile 0.923 
50th percentile 0.940 
75th percentile 0.956 
Maximum 0.983 
Source: Authors’ computation.  
The effect of land markets on land use efficiency 
In this section, we report the determinants of households’ land use efficiency scores 
with an emphasis on the role of land markets.5 Table 6 reports the main results. The 
F-statistics from the joint significance test on the strength of the two instrumental 
variables were 47.75 (P-value = 0.000) and 169.13 (P-value = 0.000) for renting in 
and renting out respectively, suggesting that there need be no concern about weak 
instruments. The F-statistics from the joint significance test of the instrumental 
variables in Eq. (11) was 1.17 (p-value = 0.558), implying that the two instrumentals 
were valid. While the residual from the first stage estimation on renting out land was 
insignificant, the residual from the renting in land estimation was significant at the 10 % 
level, which means that household participation in land markets is endogenous and 
                                                 
5 Since the determinants of household participation in land markets are beyond the interest of this paper, the first 




deems the instrumental variable approach necessary. 
Table 6. The effect of land rental on land use efficiency 
Variables Average marginal effect 
Rent in 0.039** 
 
(0.019) 
Rent out 0.006 
 
(0.01) 
Age of household head 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Education of household head 0.001 
 (0.002) 
Off-farm experience of household head 0.006** 
 (0.003) 
Household size 0.000 
 (0.001) 
Land endowment 0.000 
 (0.001) 
Number of land plots 0.001 
 (0.001) 
Agricultural training -0.001 
 (0.004) 
Agricultural assets 0.001 
 (0.001) 




Residual (Rent in) -0.020* 
 
(0.011) 




Note: Town dummies are controlled for, but not reported. Clustered standard errors at the village 
level are reported in parentheses. The F-statistic from the joint significance tests on the strength of 
instruments for renting in and renting out are 47.75 (p-value = 0.000) and 169.13 (p-value = 0.000) 
respectively. The F-statistic for the exclusion restriction test from Eq. (11) is 1.17 (p-value = 0.558). 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 




We found that renting in land had a positive effect on household land use efficiency (p 
< 0.05). The average marginal effect of renting in land was 0.039, which means that 
renting in land increases land use efficiency by 3.9 %. This is in line with expectations 
and in general is consistent with the arguments in previous studies finding that land 
markets lead to an increase in land productivity (Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert, 2016; 
Deininger and Jin, 2005; Feng et al., 2010; Jin and Deininger, 2009). The effect of 
renting out land, however, was insignificant, suggesting that the overall effect of 
renting out land on land use efficiency tends to be zero. There could be different 
causes of this, as outlined in section two. Authorities may also push farmers to 
transfer land (Liu et al., 2017), and behaviour may not be driven by an attempt to 
increase efficiency. Indeed, Liu et al. (2016) find that the farmers’ decisions to rent 
out land in rural China are influenced by political interference. 
Table 6 also reports the effects of other factors on land use efficiency. We found that 
household heads’ previous off-farm experience had a positive and significant effect on 
land use efficiency, which supports the argument that off-farm experience can 
increase productivity through investments (Kousar and Abdulai, 2015; Rozelle et al., 
1999). Similarly, Ma et al. (2018) also found that off-farm employment is positively 
related to yield level in China. The value of other durable assets in the family showed 
a positive effect on land use efficiency. The statistical significance was at the 5 % 




for in our model to increase their yields. Experience with natural disasters, which, as 
we have argued, partly captures land quality, showed a negative effect on land use 
efficiency, which is intuitive because disasters can cause significant yield losses. 
Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of the effects of land market participation on land use efficiency, 
we conducted two additional analyses. First, after the estimation of Eq. (6) and (7), 
we predicted households’ probability of renting in and out land. We then estimated Eq. 
(5) by replacing 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 with the predicted probability. Standard 
errors were adjusted with 1,000 bootstraps. This is called a “plug-in” approach which 
is often used to complement the control function approach in empirical work (e.g. 
Brasselle et al. (2002), Rao et al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2017)). The estimates in Table 
A. 2 confirmed our previous results. 
Second, we re-calculated land use efficiency scores by assuming that the error term of 
technical inefficiency in the translog production function was half-normally 
distributed or by using a Cobb-Douglas rather than a translog production function, 




efficiency scores. A likelihood ratio test (LR chi2 = 19.63, p = 0.545)6 showed no 
significant difference between the Cobb-Douglas and the translog production 
functions, suggesting that the more complex model specification of the translog 
production function was not preferred. A different model specification would alter the 
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� for the 
Cobb-Douglas model), which might lead to different results. However, as shown in 
Table A. 2, this was not the case. 
Third, the skewed land use efficiency scores (Fig. 1) raised the concern that our 
results could be driven by outliers. Thus, we re-estimated Eq. (10) after dropping 
observations with land use efficiency scores below the 5 % level. The results showed 
that the previous inferences still held (Table A. 2). 
Identifying causal channels 
Given the positive effect of renting in land on land use efficiency, one interesting 
question may be how this effect emerges. Here we provide some evidence on the 
potential causal channels introduced earlier. First, we tested whether the positive 
effect of renting in land resulted from economies of scale. If renting in land improves 
                                                 
6 We performed the test based on the results of the Cobb-Douglas and translog production functions with 




land use efficiency via the change in the area of cultivated land, land input should be a 
strong predictor of land use efficiency. However, the insignificance of land 
endowments on land use efficiency in Table 6 suggests that economies of scale may 
not be important. As households may use more (less) land than land endowment for 
production, especially when land rental is present, land endowments may capture the 
exact land input. Thus, we replaced land endowment with land input and estimated its 
effect on land use efficiency using Eq. (5) after excluding households that either rent 
in or rent out land. The effect of land input remained insignificant. These results 
suggest that renting in land does not affect land use efficiency through the change in 
land input, in line with the argument of Rigg et al. (2016) that economies of scale may 
be limited in farming. 
Second, we tested whether the positive effect of renting in land on land use efficiency 
was due to better land quality. Note that we introduced a measure of land quality – 
disaster experience – in our estimation. It is evident that flood and drought 
significantly increase soil nitrogen losses and reduce the functionality of soil microbes 
(Nguyen et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2016). The positive effect of renting in land should 
therefore be independent of land quality. Although disaster experience may not fully 
capture land quality, it approximates a general tendency of land quality. Thus, we 
further tested this causal channel by investigating whether traded land was of better 




all other control variables. The results (Table A. 3) showed that disaster experience 
was significantly and negatively correlated with renting out land, implying that 
households that rent out land are less likely to have experienced disasters. This 
provides suggestive evidence that traded land is of poorer quality, which is consistent 
with the literature (Rahman, 2010) but in contrast to the proposed causal channel. 
Third, we tested whether the positive effect of renting in land results from variations 
in property rights. Without the separation of inputs and outputs from land with 
different property rights, this cannot be directly tested. However, given the positive 
effect of renting in, land use efficiency for rented land could be expected to be greater 
than that for owned land. In this case, land use efficiency should increase with the 
household’s share of rented in land. To test this hypothesis, we interacted the variable 
of rent-in with households’ land endowment and then calculated the average marginal 
effect of rent-in when households’ land endowments are fixed at different values. The 
results (Table A. 4), however, showed an increasing average marginal effect of rent-in, 
which again did not support a causal impact of property rights. 
Fourth, we tested whether a high labour-land input ratio due to labour market failures 
could drive the positive effect of renting in. Households with a higher labour-land 
input ratio could be expected to show a larger effect of rent-in. Thus, we generated a 
new variable defined as the ratio of actual labour input to land input. We included the 




average marginal effects of rent-in for different values of households’ labour-land 
ratio. The results in Table 7 showed an increasing average marginal effect of rent-in, 
thus supporting our hypothesis. This finding is in line with the argument that land 
markets will improve land use efficiency if there is labour market failure (Deininger et 
al., 2018; Lamb, 2003). 
Table 7. The interaction effect of renting in land with labour-land input ratio on land use efficiency 
Variables Average marginal effects 
Rent in (labour-land input ratio = 1) 0.035** 
 (0.017) 
Rent in (labour-land input ratio = 5) 0.036** 
 (0.016) 
Rent in (labour-land input ratio = 10) 0.037** 
 (0.016) 
Rent in (labour-land input ratio = 15) 0.038** 
 (0.016) 
Rent in (labour-land input ratio = 20) 0.039** 
 (0.016) 
Note: This table reports the average marginal effect of renting in land on land use efficiency when 
household labour-land input ratio is fixed at different representative values. Other variables are 
controlled. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
 
Conclusions 
On a global scale, population growth and a decrease in agricultural land raises 
concerns about food security. An efficient use of scarce land has therefore also 




policy instrument for enhancing land use efficiency. In this paper, we derived a 
measure of land use efficiency using a stochastic frontier production function, and 
estimated the causal effect of farm households’ participation in land markets on land 
use efficiency using a control function approach. We also provide suggestive evidence 
on the causal channels of land market development on land use efficiency. Our 
analysis complements the existing literature on the economic consequences of land 
markets. Our empirical results allow three main conclusions to be drawn. 
First, on average about 7.53 % of agricultural land has been overused, which provides 
room for efficiency improvements in rice production in our study area that could 
eventually also enhance food security. While many policies focus on the maintenance 
of agricultural land, e.g. by limiting land conversion for cities, improving the land use 
efficiency of existing farmland may be a viable way of increasing yields without 
compromising urban development. Second, households that rent in land have a 
significantly higher land use efficiency. Allowing households to rent in land from 
others can positively contribute to higher rice yields in China. Although we did not 
find an effect of renting out land on land use efficiency, it is possible that if the 
political pressure to rent out land were lower, such effects would have been found. 
Third, the positive effect of renting in land on land use efficiency appears to be the 
result of a high labour-land input ratio due to labour market failure. Although in our 




China, this finding implies that the current opportunity costs of farming are low. 
Removing labour market constraints could further contribute to a sustainable 
development of the sector in the future. 
Our paper does have some limitations. Despite our efforts to develop a solid 
identification strategy, we were hampered by the availability of cross-sectional data. 
Panel data would have allowed us to limit the risk of bias from omitted variables, such 
as farming ability. The small sample size at village level also makes it difficult to 
control for village-level effects. Our research area is known for intensive farming and 
therefore could have greater land use efficiency than other areas in China. Thus, our 
results may predominately extrapolate to other developed areas, but they should be 
validated and complemented by other case studies. 
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Table A 1. Determinants of renting in and renting out land 
Variables Rent in Rent out 
Age of household head -0.017*** 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Education of household head 0.050 0.041 
 (0.064) (0.071) 
Off-farm experience of household head -0.099 0.067 
 (0.115) (0.129) 
Household size -0.012 -0.042 
 (0.028) (0.034) 
Land endowment -0.007 0.073*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
Number of land plots -0.056* 0.060** 
 (0.032) (0.029) 
Agricultural training 0.382*** -0.098 
 (0.115) (0.132) 
Agricultural asset 0.083*** -0.013 
 (0.029) (0.033) 
Other durable asset  -0.013 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Disaster 0.160 -0.261* 
 (0.108) (0.145) 
Share of households in land rental market 1.703*** 2.651*** 
 (0.272) (0.284) 
Administrative intervention -0.930*** 1.591*** 
 (0.216) (0.293) 
Constant 0.256 -3.752*** 
 (0.559) (0.575) 
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.272 
Log likelihood -483.782 -350.559 
Observations 987 885 
Note: The table reports coefficients. Clustered standard errors at the village level are reported in 
parentheses. The F-statistic form the joint significance tests on the strength of instruments for renting 
in and renting out are 47.75 (p = 0.000) and 169.13 (p = 0.000) respectively. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 





Table A 2. Results from robustness tests 
Variables 
Average marginal effect 
Robustness test I Robustness test II Robustness test III Robustness test IV 
Rent in 0.052** 0.046* 0.038** 0.033** 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) 
Rent out 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.008 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (-0.011) (0.008) 
Residual (rent in) 
 
-0.024* -0.019* -0.018* 
  
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009) 
Residual (rent out) 
 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  
(0.008) (0.007) 0.033 
Note: Robustness test I is from the estimation with the “plug-in” approach. Robustness test II is from the 
estimation with a half-normal distributed error term in a translog production function. Robustness test III 
is from the estimation with a Cobb-Douglas production function. Robustness test IV is from the 
estimation after excluding outliers. All other variables are controlled. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 






Table A 3. Correlation of land markets and disaster 
Variables Correlation coefficients 
Rent in 0.101 
 
(0.106) 
Rent out -0.307** 
 
(0.147) 
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the village level are reported in parentheses. All other variables 
and town dummies are controlled. 







Table A 4. The interaction effect of renting in land with land endowments on land use efficiency 
Variables Average marginal effects 
Rent in (land endowment = 1 mu) 0.034** 
 (0.016) 
Rent in (land endowment = 5 mu) 0.036** 
 (0.016) 
Rent in (land endowment = 10 mu) 0.038** 
 (0.017) 
Rent in (land endowment = 15 mu) 0.041** 
 (0.019) 
Rent in (land endowment = 20 mu) 0.043** 
 (0.022) 
Note: This table reports average marginal effects of renting in land on land use efficiency when 
household land endowment is fixed at different representative values. Other control variables are the 
same as those in Table 6. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
 
 
